Introduction
A firm"s auditor choice decision is the outcome of a complex process involving a number of: (1) strategic considerations; (2) efficient contracting considerations; (3) lower information asymmetry considerations; (4) information risk considerations; and (5) financial considerations (Hribar, Kravet and Wilson, 2010; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2003; Francis, Maydew and Sparks, 1999; Fan and Wong, 2005; Datar, Feltham and Hughes, 1991 [respectively] ). There is evidence that a higher quality audit results in (or is associated with) higher quality earnings, lower cost of capital and lower IPO under pricing (Titman and Trueman, 1986) . However, Datar et al."s (1991) cost-benefit consideration is open to question because a higher quality auditor, although nominally costly, may actually be cost-efficient.
In line with the above, it is plausible to expect firms to opt for higher quality auditors despite the expected fee premium. In the absence of moral hazard, it is rational to expect efficiency considerations to rule auditor choice. That means larger clients and clients with complex audits will have incentives to hire a superior quality auditor, while clients with inherent audit risks and those who stand to lose from the scrutiny of a reputed auditor will have incentives to opt for a less reputed auditor (Habib, 2011) . This line of reasoning points to an ethical dimension of auditor choice, suggesting firms with higher ethical values will make an efficient choice and not an opportunistic one. However, it has not been empirically tested whether a firm"s ethical values affect auditor choice. The decision will be based on whether the value derived from a superior quality auditor outweighs the cost (Cullinan, Du and Zheng, 2012) .
Auditor choice, therefore, can be viewed as a self-regulatory mechanism instituted by a client to supplement corporate governance mechanisms in place within the firm. Rezaee (2004) , Fan and Wong (2005) and Choi and Wong (2007) find that the audit, in general, performs an important monitoring role in countries characterized by weak corporate governance. By choosing a higher quality auditor, a client, directly or indirectly, binds itself to higher standards of financial reporting and assurance qualities.
Bonding argument suggests that higher audit quality also acts as a supplement to the investor protection regime (or the lack of it) prevailing in the market in which the firm operates. While the choice is generally left to the client, there are instances of securities market oversight bodies attempting to regulate, or at least influence, auditor choice. For example, in France, large companies are required to hire at least two audit firms and once hired, auditors must be retained for 6 years. Similar examples can be found in Spain where a mandatory auditor rotation requirement was introduced in early 2000. Furthermore, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted in 2002, requires the lead audit partner and the audit review partner to be rotated every five years in US public company audits (Daniels and Booker, 2011) . Such instances present a scenario in which auditor choice is not permanent, and thus does not provide an appropriate determination of board ethics. Apart from these few instances, however, auditor choice can be viewed as a tool for self-regulation.
Prior research on the determinants of auditor choice "provides convincing evidence that, on average, audit quality increases with auditor size" (Hope et al., 2008, p. 358) and that "high-quality audits serve as a useful corporate governance mechanism by reducing information asymmetries and agency conflicts between the firm and its stockholders" (Hope et al., 2008, p. 358) . We find as a result of our tests that firms are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor if they have a highly ethical board and operate in an ethical environment. Furthermore, we investigate the association between board ethical values and auditor choice to see if it is influenced by board size, and find that board size has a positive effect on this relationship.
This paper contributes to current literature by addressing the relationship between board ethics and auditor choice, which has not been studied previously. We utilise a large sample, consisting of 132,853 firm-years from 46 countries (from the World Economic Forum, 2008), which creates a rich basis for empirical review of this relationship, and creates globally applicable results. Furthermore, by controlling for other factors, we find there remains a strong association between the ethics of a firm"s board and their choice of auditor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with a theoretical framework that outlines the expected influences on the auditor choice decision. Then, our hypotheses are developed on the basis of this conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the measures for the dependent, independent and control variables and the sample selection procedure. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 provides the conclusion.
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development
"Ethics is primarily a communal, collective enterprise, not a solitary one," which flows through the firm, and into the public eye, as a result of the values instilled by the board (Azmi, 2006 p. 1) . This is supported by former SEC Chairman Donaldson, who states that "the most important thing that a Board of Directors should do is to determine the elements that must be embedded in the company's moral DNA. It should be the foundation on which the board builds a corporate culture based on a philosophy of high ethical standards and accountability." (SEC Chairman, William H. Donaldson, 2003) . Several academic studies suggest there are many benefits of acting ethically, such as improved financial and non-financial firm performance (Verschoor, 1998) , as well as the creation of a sustainable competitive advantage (Azmi, 2006) .
According to the Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 78, "a code of ethics and ethical values are important elements of the internal control process of public companies," and although the failure of senior management to adhere to the values published in a firm"s code of ethics is not in violation of the law, it may create a poor public perception of the firm (Pittman and Navran, 2003) . Furthermore, recent actions from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggest they may create a requirement for firms to disclose their core values, of which failure to adhere would be a violation of the SEC law (Pittman and Navran, 2003) .
Auditing is a profession which is required due to the nature of the principalagent relationship which exists in the corporate world, and the ease with which companies could otherwise exploit such a relationship (Salehi, 2010; Eilifsen and Messier, 2000) . Such exploitation is prevalent where the interests of the principals and agents diverge, and leads to information asymmetry (Salehi, 2010) . In order to minimise such divergences, principals must establish monitoring systems, of which the financial statement audit is arguably the most robust (Salehi, 2010) . In this, the auditor provides "reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatements" (Fernando et al., 2010, as cited in Hajiha and Sobhani, 2012 p. 159).
Whilst financial statement audits are an invaluable control mechanism, not all audit firms have the same level of knowledge and expertise, and hence demand for auditing varies based on the quality of the auditor. The effectiveness of the audit varies with the quality of the auditor (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam, 1998; Cullinan et al., 2012) . There is an observable economic effect, which results from the employment of an audit firm with an average reputation (Cullinan et al., 2012) . For example, in grouping audit firms into three categories (Big 4, Second Tier and Third Tier), Cullinan et al., (2012) show that although there is little negative market effect from a firm"s switch from a Big 4 to Second Tier auditor, there is a large negative market effect when switching from a Big 4 to Third Tier auditor. DeAngelo (1981) notes that, in order to assess audit quality, readers of the financial statements will have to make three judgements: (i) whether the amount and nature of audit work undertaken is appropriate for the particular client company; (ii) how technically competent the audit staff are to undertake the work properly; and (iii) how independent the audit firm is and hence how likely it is to report any unadjusted errors or omissions that it finds. To make these judgements the readers need to see the audit working papers and interview the key personnel involved in the audit (Moizer, 1997) . Since this is impossible, an indirect way of assessing audit quality is whether auditors have been sued for failing to detect and/or report material misstatements.
Thus, high quality auditors will be less willing to accept questionable accounting practices because if they do so, and later an audit failure is suspected, their reputational capital will suffer. Consistent with the arguments above, Beatty (1989) reasons that Big 4 auditors are seen as more independent, thus providing a higher quality audit, due to their investment in reputational capital. Big 4 audits are perceived as being of the highest quality, due primarily to the large portfolio of well-known corporate clients who contract Big 4 auditors (Beatty, 1989) . Furthermore, Big 4 auditors invest heavily in training facilities and programs to ensure their independence and the quality of their work (Beatty, 1989) . It is also important to note there is a difference between an auditor discovering a financial discrepancy and actually reporting that discrepancy. Khurana and Raman (2004, p. 475) state that "the ability to detect material error in the financial statements is a function of auditor competence, while the propensity to correct/reveal the material error is a function of auditor independence from the client." Hope et al. (2008) suggest that poor ethical values lead to an increase in the prevalence of firms withholding important financial information, and thus the risk of auditors entering into a professional relationship with such firms increases. Therefore, intuitively, high quality auditors are more likely to accept clients operating in countries with high board ethical values (Feltham, Hughes and Simunic, 1991; Simunic and Stein, 1996) . Simunic and Stein (1996) also suggest that audit quality decreases as the risk of firms withholding important information increases.
Therefore, we expect that boards with high ethical values will seek high quality audits by contracting a Big 4 auditor. This expectation also works vice versa, in that, as empirical evidence has shown, Big 4 auditors will generally only accept clients where the board exhibits high ethical values. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
H1: There is a positive association between the ethical values of a board and their selection (or non-selection) of a Big 4 auditor H1 is our main hypothesis, as this paper seeks primarily to address the relationship between board ethics and auditor choice, and subsequently, auditor quality. However, numerous studies have indicated that larger boards have greater corporate governance, as larger boards are more likely to have a greater number of quality directors. DeAngelo (1981) and Datar et al. (1991) suggest that larger and more prestigious auditors and audit firms have greater incentives to provide a high quality audit, in order to protect their investment in reputational capital. Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) further argue that, although all audit firms must comply with certain standards, larger audit firms are more likely to voluntarily invest in higher levels of expertise. If it is true that board ethical values affect auditor choice, then the effect of board size should be increased with the extent to which a particular firm is exposed to the behavior of board members. Similarly to what these studies suggest, we expect board ethics will be improved the greater the size of the board in a firm. Therefore, our second hypothesis is: (Francis et al., 1999; Francis et al., 2003; Hope, 2003; Fan and Wong, 2005; Hope et al., 2008) . Perhaps the most important of these, investor protection (INV_PRO), is included to test whether firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. This measure is based on two proxies, obtained from assets; and ROE, the current year"s return on equity. All these variables (except for those which are dichotomous) are translated into US dollars, based on exchange rates for the 31 st of December in each respective financial year. This is to avoid any discrepancies owing to the valuation of different currencies and natural yearly fluctuations of these values. (2008), is included as the different premiums auditors charge will effect a firm"s auditor choice, due to their desire to maintain high cashflows. ROE is included to address the potential effect of a firm"s profitability on auditor choice.
SIZE, SHORT, LONG
Equation 1 also incorporates year-specific dummy variables and additional controls for omitted variables. We obtain sample statistics for empirical testing from 77 different industries, defined in the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), of which "consumer services" has the largest portion (16.50%), followed by "software and services" and "chemicals" (10.89% and 8.90% respectively). These additional dummy variables and controls for omitted variables are not included in the tables for succinctness.
[Insert Table 1 here]
To test whether the board size (BOD_SIZE) impacts the effect of board ethical values, we use the firm"s number of directors on the board. We then repeat Eq. (1) but add BOD_SIZE as an interaction term with ETHICS (ETHICS*BOD_SIZE). We hypothesize that the coefficient on the interaction term will be positive.
Sample Selection
The financial statement data was extracted from the OSIRIS database 1 for the period Table 2 , and details of the sample and variables used in the tests are reported in Table 3 .
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here]
Empirical Results

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Firstly, we present the descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations of the regression variables. The overall mean of BIG4, taken from Panel A of Table 3 is 0.53, indicating that 53% of sampled firms hire a Big 4 auditor. Panel A of Table 3 reports the pooled distribution of the firm-level regression variables. The mean board size is 8.
The mean values of the control variables accord with expectations.
US firms are most heavily represented in the sample (n = 47,405), as indicated in Panel B of Table 3 , followed by firms in Japan (n = 13,840) and South Korea (n = 9949 should be interpreted cautiously as they do not control for differences in firm characteristics or for country characteristics which may affect firms" auditor choices.
Consequently, we now turn to the multivariate tests.
Multivariate Analysis
Based on Eq. (1) 2 , we present six regression models including each of the country- [Insert Table 5 here]
To address sensitivity of the results towards countries that are more heavily represented in terms of observations, we deleting several countries which have very high numbers of observations. Panel B of Table 5 Tables 5 both in terms of the sign and statistical significance(for brevity the results are not reported). We thus conclude that smaller countries do not constrain the results.
The interaction between ETHICS and BOD_SIZE is positive and significant for all models reported in Panel A of [Insert Table 6 here]
In sum, these regression tests support our hypotheses that firms in high board ethical values countries are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor, and that this relation is reinforced by firms" board size.
Robustness Tests
Supplementary to our controls for firm level determinents, we also control for the effects of the corporate tax rate.
For example, if a Russian firm derives most of its revenues from operations in Europe or if the firm is cross-listed on the London Stock
Exchange, the firm is less likely to be affected by domestic norms-such as the extent of low board ethical values in the country than other, less internationally-oriented, Russian firms. For this reason, we examine if the relation between ethics and auditor choice is reinforced by the degree of internationalization measured at the country level with the relevant tax rate as the proxy. The results are similar to the results reported in Table 5 both in terms of the sign and statistical significance of the test variables of interest (with Pseudo R 2 for all six models ranging from 0.370 to 0.418) and our conclusions were not affected (for brevity the results are not reported).
Secondly, we explored the effect of ranking the data obtained from the World Economic Forum (2008) for the ETHICS variable scores, rather than simply using the raw scores. For example, although nominally one score may be only slightly higher than another, the real difference comparably with this variable may be large in comparison to the rest of the sample scores. We obtain virtually the same results in ranking these scores as for found simply using the raw scores (Pseudo R 2 for all six models ranging from 0.316 to 0.418; again, for brevity, the results are not reported).
Following Kaplan"s (2001) test of MBA student perceptions of corporate ethics (company-benefiting actions versus personal-benefiting actions) we also measured board ethics as "individualism", Hofstede"s (2001) second cultural dimension. We thus repeat the above tests using this alternative measure of board ethics. Our (unreported) results show that the board ethics measure retains its significance at less than the 0.01 level, alleviating any potential concerns that our results are specific to the choice of measure for the variable ETHICS.
Conclusion
As the first study to empirically test the relationship between board ethics and auditor choice, this study is an important addition to existing corporate governance literature.
Also, due to the large sample size, our findings are applicable to firms worldwide.
This study tests whether the strength of a firm"s board ethics relates positively to the firm"s choice of a high-quality (Big 4) auditor.
We hypothesise, firstly, that a positive relationship will exist between board ethics and a firms selection (or non-selection) of a Big 4 auditor. We find support for this hypothesis through a large sample of firms taken from 46 countries worldwide.
Furthermore, we test the relationship between board size and board ethics (and subsequently the selection or non-selection of a Big 4 auditor), hypothesizing a positive relationship. We also find evidence affirming this hypothesis through our large sample size.
It is important to note that in testing the association between board ethics and auditor choice, we are not attempting to ascertain whether a causal relationship exists, but simply whether a positive relationship exists, as was addressed in Hope et al."s 
OSIRIS (2009)
Independent variables
Investor Protection (INV_PRO)
Regulatory Quality (REG)
Measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations and promote private sector development.
The World Bank (2008) Rule of Law (LAW) Measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
The World Bank ( ). OWN = the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest firms in a given country (La Porta et al., 1998) . SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total liabilities / total assets for firm i in year t. ROE= return on common equity in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. INVREC_TA = current year end inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets. SHORT = current year short term accruals. LONG = current year long term accruals. (La Porta et al., 1998) . SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total liabilities / total assets for firm i in year t. ROE = return on common equity in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. INVREC_TA = current year end inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets. SHORT = current year short term accruals. LONG = current year long term accruals. OWN = the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest firms in a given country (La Porta et al., 1998) . SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total liabilities / total assets for firm i in year t. ROE = Return on common equity in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. INVREC_TA = current year end inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets. SHORT = current year short term accruals. LONG = current year long term accruals.
